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Since the onset of logical positivism, the general wisdom of the philosophy of 
science has it that the kantian philosophy of (space and) time has been superseded 
by the theory of relativity, in the same sense in which the latter has replaced 
Newton’s theory of absolute space and time. On the wake of Cassirer and Gödel, 
in this paper I raise doubts on this commonplace. I first suggest some conditions that 
are necessary to defend the ideality of time in the sense of Kant, and I then bring to bear 
some contemporary physical theories on such conditions.  
 
 
1 What is “the problem of time”? 
 
Time is absolutely central in our inner experience, but at least since the 
foundation of modern physics, it also plays an important role in the description of 
the outer world. To the extent that there is a physical and a mental time, one can 
safely surmise that the problem of trying to establish whether and how they are 
related is one of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of time. Are 
physical and mental time in conflict, or we can regard the former as some sort of 
appropriate extension to the outer world of the main features of the latter?  
These questions, important as they are, already presuppose, however, that 
there are two sides of the problem, namely that there is, at a fundamental level of 
description, a physical time. Even independently of current physical speculations 
on the possibility that, within a quantum theory of gravity, spacetime could 
become a derived or an emergent notion, philosophers should ask questions that 
presuppose as little as possible preconceived answers. And given that the 
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quintessential philosophical problem involves what thereis, I take it that the main 
philosophical “problem of time” still involves a question that is at least as old as 
Aristotle, and that was clearly formulated by Kant:  
Q0: is time a subjective, purely ideal notion – transcendental in the sense of Kant 
– or is it rather part of the mind-independent, physical furniture of the 
universe?2  
In order to try to set the conceptual stage to begin answering this question, the 
paper is structured as follows: §2 offers some motivations as to why I take that 
Q0 just is the crux of the matter in the philosophy of time. With no pretense of 
scholarly faithfulness to the original texts, §3 offers an interpretive sketch of 
Kant’s views of time, in such a way as to distillate three conditions that are 
together necessary for the ideality of time in Kant’s sense: (i) time must be non-
substantial, and the resulting relationism must be constructed in such a way that 
both (ii) the difference between past and future and that (iii) between earlier and 
later than, must be mind-dependent. Following Gödel (1949), §4 and §5 bring to 
bear the special theory of relativity on (ii) and (iii).3 
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2 Time as the criterion of concrete existence and as principium 
individuationis: the neglect of Kant 
  
Considering the complexity of the matter, it is not unwise to begin by 
reminding ourselves of humdrum, familiar truths, that seem, however, to have 
escaped our attention entirely. D spite the fact that in ordinary language we 
sometime say that ‘we feel the passage of time’, or that ‘time flies’, time by itself, 
even more than space, appears to common sense as a “non-object” or a “non-
entity”. Since the space and time of our experienc  look as though they are devoid 
of any perceivable qualities in the ordinary sense, it would seem legitimate to 
conclude that they are also devoid of any causal power. Given that the proper ies 
of objects or events can be identified with their causal powers, time has no causal 
power because it appear to have no properties. However, if time and space are 
causally inert, why can’t we regard them as mere nothing, in the same sense in 
which empty space was, for the ancient atomists, the only instance of the 
parmenideian notion of “nothingness”?  
There appears to be at least two important reasons to reply to the above 
question in the n gative. The first is that time, together with space, is one of the 
main criteria for the reality of a concrete object or evnt, physical or mental as it 
may be. Except for the question of the existence of numbers – which, 
platonistically, could involve real but non spatiotemporally extended, abstract 
entities – one can quite plausibly claim that a non-abstract entity x is real just in 
case x occupies a portion of space and time, i.e., just in case x is i  spacetime. 
The second, related reason, is given by the fact that space and time yield a 
principle of individuation. While space distinguishes and separates physical 
objects and events that co-exist or exist at the same time, time is used to 
distinguish states or events belonging to the same substance, remaining in the 
same place or moving across space (see Howard 1997). In this sense, space and 
time, to use an expression that Auyang restricted to space, are “kind of dividers” 
(1995, 129): exactly as separation is space is regarded as sufficient to regard two 
objects as being numerically distinct, despite a perfect resemblance or even a 
qualitative identity as in quantum particles, separation in time is a necessary, 
individuating characteristic of events. It is not by chance that this conceptual 
aspect is reflected in some (pre-relativistic) theories of events, in which the 
Newtonian time of their occurrence is regarded as part of their definition, together 
with a substance and a property (see, for instance, Kim 1976).4  
Keeping in mind these remarks, two rather striking questions naturally come to 
mind:  
Q1: If time (together with space) were a non-entity (unreal), how could it yield the 
most important criterion of the reality of things and events? Shouldn’t this 
criterion imply, by itself, that time is, n some sense, real?  
Q2: How can we explain the fact that objects and events are objectively 
“separated” by space and time without also assuming that the latter, in some 
sense exist, either as “carrier” of the spatiotemporal relations in empty space, 
or as real, mind-i ependent relations exemplified by physical entities?  
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To my knowledge, questions like these have been neglected by the non-
negligible, current philosophical literature on time: Nerlich (1994), who deserves 
the credit to have first raised Q1 with respect to space, has unfortunately restricted 
his attention only to the latter. And since the inseparability of space and time 
implied by relativity is clearly not sufficient for the indistinguishability or even 
the identity of their properties, we must pay due attention to time. 
As a first, tentative answer, we could follow a suggestion to be found in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: couldn’t it be that time, together with space, is 
an priori intuition that sentient beings like ourselves necessarily 
(transcendentally) presuppose to organize and structure the sensation of the 
external and the internal world? Note that this suggestion would explain, at least 
prima facie, both why we presuppose time in every possible experience, internal 
and external, and why the spatio-temp ral relations yielded by the transcendental 
subject – to which in the following I will just refer by the expression “the mind”5 
– provide structure and order (the pure forms) to our sensations. In this way, any 
concrete phenomenon, not matter how conceptualized in terms of the categories or 
concepts (substance or event, state or process), always appear to be in space and 
time. In sum, in order to provide an answer to Q1 and Q2, prima facie there is no 
need to assume that time is a mind-independent property of the physical universe. 
It is interesting to note that with the notable exception of Ernst Cassirer (1920) 
and Kurt Gödel (1949) – who had claimed that the theory of relativity is a striking 
confirmation of Kant’s claim that time is ideal6 – virtually no philosopher in our 
century has tried to rely on a kantian explanation for these puzzling questions.7 
Quite on the contrary, the general wisdom of contemporary philosophy of science 
has it that the kantian philosophy of time has been superseded by the theory of 
relativity, in the same sense in which the latter has replaced Newton’s theory of 
absolute space and time. With respect to time, in particular, we are told that since 
any global separation between past and future events can no longer be regarded as 
absolute– i.e., as independent, as Kant still thought, of particular inertial 
reference systems or matter dis ribut on – Kant’s doctrine of time must be 
abandoned.  
In a word, relying on the widespread claim that Kant’s Critique of Pure 
reason was profoundly influenced by Newton’s doctrine of absolute space and 
time as formulated in the Principia, the great majority of the philosophers of 
science of our century has simply ignored the possibility that an important aspect 
of Kant’s philosophical theory of space and time – that advocating their 
transcendental nature – could be rescued from the abandonment of Newton’s 
physical theory of absolute space and time. As evidence that at least Gödel’s view 
on this subject differed from the received cliché, the following passage taken from 
an unpublished manuscript deserves being quoted: “the agreement described 
between certain consequences of modern physics and a doctrine that Kant set up 
150 years ago in contradiction both to common sense and to the physicists and 
philosophers of his time, is greatly surprising, and it is hard to understand why so 
little attention is being paid to it in philosophical discussion of relativity theory” 
(Gödel 1990, vol. 2, p. 236).8 
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Obviously, philosophers that are possessed by the demon of realism would 
look at the two questions above from an opposite perspective. That time and 
space cannot exist in the same sense in which objects and event exist is clear from 
the simple remark that it does not make sense to say that spacetime is in 
spacetime. If localizability in spacetime is the rule by which we establish the 
existence of something, we cannot apply he rule to spacetime itself, for reasons 
that are even stronger than those that are usually presupposed by the claim that 
the standard meter in Paris is not one meter long. However, couldn’t one grant 
that time exists unlike any ordinary object, and yet reject the kantian view, 
according to which time and space are “characteristics not inherent in the things 
in themselves, but only in their relation to our sensibility” (Kant 1783, 284)?  
 
 
3 Three logically independent senses in which time can be said to real 
 
In order to explore in more detail the plausibility of rejecting the kantian 
explanations of Q1 and Q2, let us clarify why Kant’s philosophy of time implies, 
in modern parlance, the mind- ependence of time. After all, it could be objected 
that Gödel’s attribution to Kant of the claim that “time is ideal” is quite 
illegitimate. Especially in view of the famous distinction between phenomena and 
noumena, it could be replied that, according to Kant, time is unreal only insofar 
as it is referred to the noumena, or to the things in themselves, which are neither 
in space nor in time, but that, whenever it is referred to the world of phenomena, 
it is real. Isn’t this the essential meaning of the famous kantian view according to 
which “time is empirically real but transcendentally ideal”?9  
Despite the undeniable fact that our current philosophical terminology can be 
superposed only partially with Kant’s, I take it as uncontroversial that to the 
extent that it is a pure intuition, and is therefore an a priori form of our 
sensations and observations, time for Kant cannot be regarded as existing in a 
mind-independent way (“time, apart from the subject, is nothing in itself”). To the 
extent that Kant’s noumenal world can be identified, following Gödel, with 
whatever goes beyond the directly observable entities – a world that, going 
beyond the phenomena, according to van Fraassen (1980) is and will remain 
forever inaccessible to our knowledge – the thesis that time is “transcendentally 
ideal” can have (at leas) three related, “modern” interpretations: 
(a) it may mean that time (i.e., spacetime) does not exist over and above physical 
entities, in particular those that are required to measure distances and 
temporal intervals.  
(b) supposing that such a relationism is true, t may mean that any statement 
containing temporal relations referred to unobservable physical entities in van 
Fraassen’s sense is reducible to relati ns between non-spatiotemporal, purely 
physical properties of events. If time can be “defined away”, and it is 
therefore not a fundamental ingredient of the world as described by theoretical 
physics, we would have a situation like the one that is hypothesized, say, by 
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the yet-to-be-built quantum theory of gravity, in which time is a purely 
“derived”, “emerg nt” entity; 
(c) it may mean that time as presupposed by theoretical physical models cannot 
be accounted for in terms of possible experiences of observers. In this case, 
the time of our experience can not be referred to the physical world at all, 
simply because it is incompatible with time as is conceived, say, within 
spacetime physics. 
Clearly, the claim expressed in (a) is denied by a realist about time and 
spacetime: if time, regarded as the temporal aspect of spacetime, exists as a 
theoretical entity, then it exists over and above – i. ., independently of – the 
observable events and things located in it, and therefore, in particular, 
independently of the knowing subject. In this case, not only could the reductionist 
program not be completed, but what matters more, Kant’s theory of time would 
be simply false, in the same sense in which Kant himself took the Newtonian 
thesis of the “existence of time as independent of anything external” as being 
incompatible with his view.  
As for (b), which presupposes the tru  of (a), it should be regarded as a 
condition of coherence of any mind-dependent, kantian view of time: any 
difference in our experience must be accounted by a difference in the objective 
world: as Weyl used to say quoting Helmholtz, “a difference in the giv n 
perceptions always rests upon real conditions”. In our case, the postulated, 
theoretical physical world, which we (somewhat arbitrarily) identify with the 
noumenal world, must contain something that is capable of giving rise to our 
experience of time, via the encounter of the physical world with our sensibility. 
This something could, for instance, be causation, physicalistically described.10 
For our purposes, it is not necessary to go into details in this context, which could 
be extremely relevant for the emergence of time in quantum gravity; let it suffice 
to say that if a kantian program were to succeed, such a relation of causation 
should be characterizable in wholly non-temporal terms. 
However, while substantivalism alone would be sufficient to reject Kant’s 
philosophy of time (a possibility that Gödel did not consider), relationism by itself 
would not suffice to confirm it: Kant was no relationist either. In fact, even if we 
granted the relationist that time (spacetime) has no independent, substantial 
existence, but just amounts to certain temporal relations exemplified by physical 
entities of some sort, what matters more to evaluate Kant’s theory of time is the 
issue whether such temporal relations, whatever they are, are xemplified by 
physical ev nts independently of observers. This latter issue, in its turn, is 
tantamount to asking whether the discriminations of the time of our experience 
can be coherently attributed to the physical world as described by our best 
spacetime theories.  
Clearly, such an issue calls into play the question raised in (c) above, which 
here will be given central emphasis, given that they also correspond to the way in 
which Gödel viewed the relationship between relativity theory and kantian 
philosophy. He was in fact convinced that Kant was too skeptical about the 
possibility of getting to know the things in themselves, and thought that Einstein’s 
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contribution to physics had to be regarded as evidence that we have somehow 
been capable of throwing a partial glance at the noumenal w rld (see Wang 1995, 
222). However, Gödel could argue in favor of some sort of progress in our 
knowledge of the noumenal world only to the extent that the time of our 
experience cannot be applied to the physical universe. Not by chance, Gödel’s 
only quotation of Kant is directed at exactly this point “Those affections which 
we represent to ourselves as changes, in beings with other forms of cognition 
would give rise to a perception in which the idea of time, ad therefore also of 
change, would not occur at all” (Gödel 1949, p.558).11 Gödel’s claim – to be 
evaluated in the following – according to which the time of our experience cannot 
be accommodated by Einstein’s theory of relativity becomes then of paramount 
importance, since assumes a whole new dime sion n the theory of knowledge. If 
my reading of Gödel is correct, such a claim becomes in fact a suggestive piece of 
evidence that Einstein’s theory of relativity helped us to peek behind the veil of 
Maya of phenomena, and that such an overcoming of the bounds of our senses are 
indeed possible! 
One way to gather evidence about the objectivity of the temporal 
discriminations of our experience (“those affections which we represent ourselves 
as changes”) is to look at the way we speak about time. As the anlytic 
philosophy of time of our century has made abundantly clear, there are in fact wo 
ways of distinguishing events in time, the tenseless way of “earlier and later than”, 
giving us the changeless order of succession, and the tensed way of past, present 
and future, giving us transition and passage. Th  former way calls into question 
the mind- ependence of the distinction between earlier and later, and therefore not 
only its reducibility to asymmetrical physical processes but, more in general, the 
vexed issued of the origin and nature of de facto irreversible physical processes 
(the so-called “arrow of time”). The latter way, by involving the issue of the 
privileged existence of a particular instant of time, the present, which in our 
experience seems to separate the fixity of the past from the openness of the future 
– calls into play the vexed problem of the objectivity of temporal becoming, that 
is, the question whether the coming into existence at any instant of time of 
previously future facts and eventsis mind- ependent.  
Considering the by-now widely agreed-upon untranslatability of tenseless talk 
into tensed talk12, the thesis of the reality of time is then reduced to three logically 
independent issues, namely the possibility of a substantial spacetime, the mind-
independence of the distinction between earlier and later and the objectivity of 
the distinction between past, present and future. Here it is important to remark 
that a discussion of the second and the third issue is required by the fact that Kant 
does not just deny the objectivity of time and space in themselves (i.e., their 
substantiality): this, as Gödel noted in his manuscript B2 (1990, 238) had already 
been accomplished by Leibniz. The true kantian achievement, which in our 
century has been downplayed by every philosopher of space and time except 
Cassirer and Gödel, consists in the denial that temporal (and spatial) relations 
exists objectively, that is, that they are mind-indepe ent.13  
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Apart from the issue of substantival versus relational time (sp cetime) in the 
general theory of relativity – which here cannot be discussed14 – I claim that we 
should regard time as transcendental only if both the distinction between earlier 
than and later than and that between past, present and future15 is mind-dependent.  
Now, while the latter distinction is usually regarded as mind-depende t, the 
former typically isn’t,16 something which makes the thesis of the mind-dependence 
of time (the kantian view of time) particularly strong, since it implies that also the 
distinction between the two “directions” of time is relative to a temporal bias 
introduced by observers (see Price 1996). Furthermore, it should also be noted 
that although the reality of becoming would somehow affect the problem of the 
direction of time, the mind-dependence of the A series alone does not suffice to 
establish that time is ideal. It is in fact logically possible to regard the future as 
real as the past – thereby denying becoming – while claiming that time is 
“asymmetric” because of the exist nce of de facto r nomologically irreversible 
processes. However, the distinction between past present and future is so essential 
to our experience that we discovered that the special theory of relativity cannot in 
principle represent it, Kant’s theory of time would receive a significant 
confirmation by modern physics in the sense conveyed by (c) above. 
 
4. The “now” and Minkowski spacetime 
 
In what follows, I will assume that trying to establish whether the distinction 
between past, present and future has an objective, physical counterpart – and is 
therefore mind-independent – means trying to establish whether such a distinction 
is definable in terms of invariant structure of Minkowski spacetime as is 
standardly presented in physics textbooks.  
Such a choice appears preferable for two reasons. The first is given by the fact 
that the requirement of definability in terms of invariant relations ensures that the 
candidate becoming relation be invariant for all possible observers. In our 
context, such invariance suffices to ensure the intersubjective validity of the 
becoming relation, something that should be required by any theory of objective 
becoming. The second reason is given by the remark that attempts at introducing 
additional structure in Minkowski spacetime, as in Rakic (1997), essentially 
amount to change the physical theory only in order to make it compatible with 
one’s pet metaphysical hypothesis. Such a move should be resisted because, given 
a sufficient amount of tinkering with a physical theory – even if, as in Rakic’s 
case, the tinkering consists in the addition of empirically superfluous structure 
which does not lead to any contradiction with the known phenomena – on  can 
make a physical theory compatible with any metaphysical hypothesis. In this 
case, however, it is clear that the project of studying the compatibility between the 
time of our experience and the time of physics would be trivialized.  
 Our task is rather to find a geometrical structure S within Minkowski 
spacetime with respect to which one could make the distinction between what is 
already definite and fixed (the present and perhaps the past) and what is open (the 
future) required by objective becoming. Such an S should in any case be regarded 
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as a merely necessary condition f r the existence of a distinction between the 
actual (the present) and the merely possible (the future), with the tacit 
understanding that a physical theory cannot be deemed capable in princi le to 
explain what the coming into being in the present required by becoming really 
amounts to. Clearly, it is not physics’ business to tell us which instant of time is 
present, and this remarks holds for Newtonian spacetime as well as for relativity. 
However, if the postulation of S were to lead to inconsistencies with the structure 
of Minkowski spacetime, we would have discovered an inconsistency between the 
time of experience and the time of relativity theory, a fact that would lend support 
to Kant’s view of time. 
In a recent paper read at the PSA98 meeting, Savitt has produced new and 
cogent arguments against the claim that the notion of “the present”, as it is 
commonly understood in our experience of time, can be implemented in 
Minkowski spacetime (Savitt 1998). While in our experience only what occurs in 
the present properly speaking exists – let us call this view presentism, tensely or 
tenselessly construed – for Savitt “there is no time like the present” in Minkowski 
spacetime, because there is no geometrical structure capable of capturing the 
relevant metaphysical intuitions.  
Savitt considers various options that have been proposed in the literature, 
among which (1) the single spatiotemporal point or the “here-now” (Stein 1991), 
(2) events on (not in) the backward light cone (Godfrey-Smith 1979), (3) the 
spacelike-related region with respect to a point (Weingard 1972) and (4) the set of 
events that are orthogonal to the world line of an inertial observer (an hyperplane 
of simultaneity) (Putnam 1967). He finds counterintuitive features with each of 
these proposals, like the non-achronality of the second and the third option,17 or 
the arbitrariness of choosing between one “here-now” over another for option (1), 
or between two different hypersurfaces of simultaneity rela ive to two observers 
in different inertial frames for option (4). Which of the two points or the two 
hypersurfaces is the bearer of reality in a theory that, like Einstein’s relativity, 
does not consider any single “perspective” as privileged?18 As to (1), if it is 
understood as implying that each event is real from its own perspective but no 
event is privileged, it is hard to tell the difference between this “pluralistic 
solipsism”, as Stein called it (1968), and the view that all events are real, except 
that in the latter view, any event is real as of any other event, while in the former, 
reality functions as an indexical like in Lewis’ indexical theory of actuality for 
possible worlds. 
Shouldn’t we conclude that a kantian view of the distinction between past and 
future is confirmed, as Gödel had it, by the special theory of relativity? Before 
yielding to this verdict, let us give the realist about becoming the right to reply. 
Her best strategy may consist in trying to account for our experience of time by 
using the physical principles embodied in Minkowski spacetime. By making due 
allowance to the necessary idealization that is always present in any physical 
model, the most obvious choice to make for the physical counterpart of the 
present in Minkowski spacetime is an appropriately chosen segment of a 
worldline. It is obvious that the enterprise of trying to model the present in 
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Minkowski spacetime is doomed to fail from the start if we don’t have a more 
precise idea of the structure of our experience. In this respect, the notion of a 
pointlike event is completely inappropriate to model the psychological present, 
since the latter, if anything, has a certain, content-depe d , but finite (non-
pointlike) temporal duration. This fact is responsible for one of the objections 
that Savitt raised to the “here-now view of reality” in relativistic spacetimes, 
involving two observers (Carol and Ted) who are very close to each other in the 
same inertial frame. Combining the stipulation that the present is a 
spatiotemporally non-extended point with the view that only what is present is 
real, our two observers cannot recognize their reciprocal existence, (1998, 8) 
simply because they are located in causally disconnected regions of spacetime. 
Since if they are close enough, as we are supposing, in real life they do shar  t  
same present, the point-like event is clearly an inadequate choice for the present 
of our experience. Can we remedy this situation?
As we are about to see, however, the gain in faithfulness to our experience that 
could be achieved by considering a segment of a worldline as “the present” is paid 
in terms of non-invariance. The length of the experienced time along any two 
segments of two distinct worldlines in Minkowski spacetime – representing the 
different spatiotemporal carrier of Carol and Ted – is worl line-dependent, as the 
twin paradox notoriously shows.19 Since this dilemma can serve as an 
introduction to the only two rigorous results in the literature, to be evaluated later, 
it is worth delving into it in some more detail. 
Without buying into the controversial notion of the “specious present”, it is 
plausible to suppose that if the temporal interval separating two flashes of light 
presented to a normal subject diminishes more and more, below a certain minimal 
threshold the signals will be perceived as simultaneous. Let us then assume, in 
accord with various empirical findings (Giulio 1995, 151), that if the two flashes 
of light, presented as a double pulse stimulation to the rod-free foveal region of 
the retina, are temporally separated by less than approxim tely 15 milliseconds 
(14 to 19 thousands of a second), the two events are judged as being one. In this 
temporal interval, however, a light ray covers approximately 4500 kilometers. 
Imagine a sphere whose center is in the middle of this room and whose radius is 
exactly 4500 km. Think first of a flash of light emitted on the surface of the 
sphere, and then consider another event, coinciding with our turning on the light 
bulb of the projector right here, in the center of the sphere: the two events would 
be perceived as simultaneous, despite their distance. This holds, a fortiori, for 
any flash emitted within the sphere reaching our retinas within the temporal 
threshold given above.  
This fact has remarkable consequences. The only reason why we naturally 
believe that the present extends at a distance is given by the fact that our capacity 
of discriminating two signals as temporally successive allows light to travel back 
and forth many times between ourselves and the objects around us (see Stein 
1991). In the environment we have evolved, we never had to deal with objects that 
are hidden behind the visual horizon, and the latter extends far less than 4500 km, 
and is therefore well within the sphere of what we could call psychological 
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simultaneity. This is why, in the sense of a “naive physics” implanted in our 
brains through the evolution, we have evolved with the “natural” belief that 
there exists a universe of objects or events that is objectively simultaneously 
with our perception even if at a distance. However, from a physical point of 
view, a cosmic now need not exist, and the metric of Minkowski spacetime – by 
dictating the existence of events that are not causally connectable with any event 
p, no matter how small the neighborhood centered in p is – clearly bans such a 
temporal structure. 
Going back to Savitt’s criticism of option (1), it should be now clear why it 
forces us to switch from Stein’s point-like present (the here-now) to an 
appropriately long segment of a worldline (ct = 4500 Km), a modification that is 
capable of explaining why, provided they are “close enough”, as it is always the 
case in our experience, Ted has information about Carol and viceversa within a 
single act of perception. The light signals have had enough time to travel back and 
forth between parts of their worldlines on their respective light-cones, a fact that 
has interesting consequence also for the origin of our concept of space. From the 
above remarks, it follows that the physical counterparts of a set of subjectiv ly 
simultaneous events do not objectively co-exist with each other, even though in 
our experience they appear to be simultaneous. In this sense, space as the order 
of coexistence is a construction of the perceiving subject in a sense envisaged by 
Kant, exactly as a picture of the night sky shows objects in its center and on the 
sides of as if they were simultaneous, while in reality the light that reaches us 
from the sides took much longer.  
In a word, my objection to Stein’s assumption that the psychological present is 
modeled by a point, therefore, is that such an assumption is not true to the facts of 
our experience that he himself has so clearly and deeply stated. Probably the 
reason for Stein’s avoidance of the identification between our psychological 
present and a segm nt of worldline is the loss of invariance. The trouble is, 
however, that if “we stick to the point”, as Stein does, we cannot avoid the 
difficulties illustrated above about Ted and Carol not sharing their present even if 
they are very close to each other!  
Be that as it may, in order to present my other objections to Stein’s theorem – 
which defines becoming in terms of the relation of past causal connectibility 
(1991) – let us charitably set this dilemma aside, by stipulating that it can be 
solved by invoking the approximate nature of models.  
 
5. Becoming and Minkowski spacetime 
 
Once we agree that the present of our experience is to be modeled by a 
physical point, two of the premises of Stein’s theorem are easily justified by the 
explanatory scheme given above. Clearly, any event that might possibly affect our 
present experience a along the worldline of our body l should be regarded as real 
with respect to a. Otherwise, how could it be causally affecting us now? It 
follows that all events in the causal past of any event a should be regarded as 
having become as of a. Furthermore, any event b in he causal past of a such that 
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b carries the mark of some previous event c in its causal past, makes it the case 
that also c is real with respect to a. This gives us transitivity, and, together with 
our first remark, Stein’s first two premises: 
1. A becoming relation B is a transitive, reflexive relation holding among 
spacetime events;  
2. If any event a is a cause of b, the former has become (is real) as of the 
latter, that is, aBb.  
The other two premises are: 
3. the relation B is invariant under automorphisms of Minkowski spacetime 
preserving the time orientation of Minkowski spacetime;  
4. for any event , here are events that as of e re unreal, or have not become. 
While the third premise fulfils the invariance requirement postulated at the 
beginning of the fourth section,20 he fourth premise is justified by the fact that if 
we want to know whether becoming is compatible with the structure of 
Minkowski spacetime, we need to assume that it is possible, so that at least some 
events are unreal as of any event of the spacetime. On the basis of these four 
premises, Stein has proved that for any pair of events aand b, a has become as of 
b just in case a is in the causal past of b.  
Clifton and Hogarth (1995) have later extended Stein’s result to the relation of 
past chronological connectibility (becoming along a worldline), in such a way 
that the latter, together with Stein’s past causal connectibility, have been shown to 
be the only becoming relations that are definable in terms of Minkowski 
spacetime. This result in particular implies that if a single event, spacelike related 
with an event p, were regarded as being real with respect to p, then all events 
would have to be regarded real as of any other event, a result which gives us an 
additional argument to reject Weingard’s and Putnam’s proposals to identify “the 
now” with a spacelike related region (see 4. above). 
Unfortunately, there are three major conceptual problems with Stein’s and 
Clifton’s and Hogarth’s technical results (SCH from now on). The first involves 
the EPR paradox and Bell’s non-local correlations, which implies, against a 
consequence of SCH’s becoming, that spacelike related events are mutually real. 
The second is the difficulty of interpreting becoming along worldlines as a bona 
fide physical becoming, while third calls into question the origin and nature of 
the asymmetry of causation, tacitly assumed by Stein and Clifton-Hogarth n their 
theorems (see the second premise above). As I have discussed the first problem 
elsewhere (Dorato 1996), here I will conclude my discussion by broaching the 
second and the third objection in turn. 
The fact that the present is reduced to a point shows that in relativity we can’t 
have a global becoming, that is, a becoming in time, but only a local becoming 
along worldlines, each providing a chronological perspective of the whole 
spacetime. Here is a defense of this view by one of its few supporters: “What we 
need not, and I think cannot, conclude is that there is some neutrally describable 
space-time reality which each of the chronological perspective is a perspective of. 
There is no identity of instants at a distance, and no neutral position from which 
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the actual state of the world could be viewed sub specie aeternitatis – a  was 
possible in the classical picture” (Godfrey-Smith 1978, 242).  
This quotation may perhaps reply to some of the difficulties raised by Savitt 
(1998), concerning the fact that the difference between such pluralistic solipsism 
and the so-called “block view”, in which spacetime is completely laid out, is 
dubious. Perspectivism just argues that there is no perspective-independent 
description of the universe, even though all perspectives are equally admissible, 
just because reality itself is relational and perspectival: “perspective is one of the 
components of reality. Far from being its deformation, it is rather its principle of 
organization” (Ortega Y Gasset 1923/1961, p. 91). The block view of the 
universe argues, on the contrary, that Godfrey Smith’s chronological perspectives 
are purely mental, a by-product of the existence of sentient organisms that need to 
act in a timely way, and whose experienced time agrees locally with the structure 
of spacetime, which, however, is timeless and, in some sense, the sum of all 
perspectives, as a Leibnitzian God regarded as “th  monad of all the monads”.  
To a certain extent, this conflict reflects in part two broadly construed theories 
of the aims of our knowledge of the universe. Independently on one’s view of the 
matter, however, it must be admitted that science progressed by trying to 
“discount” the perspectival effects due to our special position in the universe.21 
Moreover, to the extent that the block-view theorist is correct in arguing that such 
a “perspectivism”, in order to make sense at all, needs conscious observ rs, or at 
least unconsciously perceiving monads located in every point of spacetime, the 
strategy of the realist about becoming would be completely useless. Becoming 
would in fact turn out to be mind-dependent, or at least would require a 
moderately animistic metaphysics of a Leibnizian sort. The kantian position on 
the distinction between past and future would be vindicated.  
On the other hand, the realist can still reply that the special theory of relativity 
does not need observers for its formulation. However, even granting that 
observers are only possible occupants of timelike curves, what sense does it make 
to consider a physical event as the entity with respect to which the 
“chronological perspective” above is referred to? Such a physical event a would 
have to be r garded as bearing in itself all the traces of its causal past, plus the 
dispositions to transmit the causal influence to the future, but the word 
perspective, associated to an event described physically, would have nothing but a 
metaphorical meaning. In any case, associating to the chronological perspective of 
an event in Minkowski spacetime the sum of the causal influence of its past light 
cone – an influence whose nature, given a sufficient amount of determinism, is 
coded in the properties, dispositions, or causal powers of the event itself – still 
presupposes a temporally asymmetric relation of causal connectibility, an 
assumption that also SCH have tacitly made in order to derive their result.  
This gives us the third, and more telling objection: on what grounds are we 
entitled to assume that causation (causal connectibility) is temporally 
asymmetric? If our aim is merely to show the c mpatibility of becoming and 
STR, we are free to postpone this worry, as Stein correctly did. But if we are
trying to find out whether becoming is a real feature of the universe, such a worry 
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should become central.  
Stein argues that since “the interpretation of the Einstein-Minkowski structure 
as spatio-temporal depends critically upon the principle that the sta e at any point 
a is subject to influence by the states at all points in the “causal past” of ”, it 
follows that “the states at all such points should be supposed to be definite as of 
a” (Stein 1991, 149). These quotations patently show that Stein is assuming that 
causation has temporally asymmetric and ontological implications: if becom ng is 
real, and if a causes b, the former event must be definite (real) as of the latter’s 
viewpoint. The converse, however, does not hold, otherwise also events in the 
future light cone should be regarded as real. But if we are assuming that 
becoming is mind- ependent, from the temporal viewpoint of its cause, each of 
its possible effects should be regarded as unreal.  
Clearly, attributing the arrow of causation such an ontological status requires 
a justification in physicalistic terms, in contrast to those theories claiming that the 
arrow of causation depends only on the existence of conscious agents. If the 
origin of the arrow of causation were subjective (Healey 1983, Price 1996), 
relativistic becoming — depending as it does on a temporally asymmetric 
causation — would end up being subjective as well.22 Consequently, there 
appears to be an important link between the two main issues of the philosophy of 
time hinted above that needs to be explored, and that calls into question the 
relationship between becoming and the arrow of time (earlier and later), the third 
sense of “ideal/real” required by a kantian approach to time. One of the merits of 
SCH is actually have brought to the fore such a relationship. 
Since I have discussed the issue in another paper23, here I will simply state the 
main difficulties. Causation is the fundamental asymmetry of our experience, and 
clearly depends on the fact that we can act only for the sake f future. Other 
asymmetries of our experience, like that of traces, counterfactual dependence and 
explanation, depend on that of causation: if we backward causation were a 
common phenomenon, we would have traces of the future and counterfactual 
dependence of present events on the future rather than on the past, as well as 
explanation of present events by future causes. Unfortunately for the causal 
realist, and despite the important role of the asymmetry of asymmetry in our 
experience, any philosophical analysis that tries to reduce such an asymmetry to 
some physical process, or to an exchange of conserved physical quantities, must 
rely on physical laws of conservation (see Dowe 1992, Heathcote 1989, Salmon 
1994). Since the latter are time reversal in a iant, Stein’s assumption of an 
asymmetry in the causal relation, at least in physicalistic terms, is unjustified, 
unless one can relate it to de facto asymmetric phenomena in time. However, 
such an association of the direction of causation with entropy growth or positive 
energy (Faye 1997) would be extrinsic: there is nothing in the concept of cause or 
effect that is in any way linked to physical attributes that make an event into a 
cause or an effect.  
Of course, one could reply that the justification of a d rection of causation is in 
our experience: we cannot affect the past, we can influence the future, so that the 
latter must be conceptualized as “empty” or open. But if we are trying to decide 
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whether such an intuition is objective, we cannot rely o a metaphysical 
elaboration of common sense. It is only physics that can tell us whether causation 
is objectively asymmetric as required by Stein’s assumption for becoming: if the 
only justification for the asymmetry of causation comes from metaphysics, for our 
purposes we would be moving in a circle. 
 
In view of these difficulties, I think one can safely conclude that any form of 
becoming – even the tenseless, relational form advocated by Stein, which has 
been regarded as a watering down of its stronger, tensed version (Callender 1997) 
– cannot be reconciled with the special theory of relativity. In any of the choices 
presented above, the kind of time that one would recover by trying to define 
becoming in Minkowski spacetime would have so little in common with 
experienced time that Gödel’s claim about the inapplicability of the time of our 
experience to a mind-independent world seems correct. It is at least ironical to 
remark that Kant’s view of time seems vindicated by that very theory (relativity) 
that many 20th century philosophers regarded as its official burier. 
 
                                            
1 I want to thank especially Jan Faye, Massimo Pauri, Mario Piazza, Robert Rynasiewicz and 
Steven Savitt for having read a previous version of the manuscript. Jeremy Butterfield, Elena 
Castellani, Marisa Dalla Chiara, Jesus Moisterin, Pieter Vermaas and, in general, the audience 
in Krakow, have raised interesting questions, that forced me to further clarify my thoughts. I 
obviously claim unique responsibility for the remaining mistakes.  
2 Physicists currently engaged in building a quantum theory of gravity are beginning to suggest 
that “time emerges from the observer/observed relation or just is such a relation” (Rovelli 1997, 
p. 217).  
3 The question (iii) will not be discussed in full, but only in its relation with (ii). 
4 Correcting Kim’s definition to make it relativistically invariant simply entails the addition of a 
spatial location to the proper time of occurrence, where proper has the technical sense of 
relativity. 
5 Even though this rendering could be accused by Kantian scholars of being too “psychologistic”, 
here I am only concerned to study the problem of the mind-dependence of the temporal relations 
and not the conceptual-logical question of the condition of possibility of our knowledge in 
general. 
6 For Gödel’s theory of time, see Yourgrau (1991), Savitt (1994), Wang (1995) and Earman 
(1995, ch. 6).  
7 A brilliant, contemporary exception is Pauri (2000). 
8 This quotation is taken from manuscript B2, written between 1946 and 1949, and therefore as a 
preparation to Gödel’s 1949a. 
9 “Our observations prove the empirical reality of time, that is, its objective validity with respect 
to any object that can ever be given to our senses” (Kant 1787, 2 section, ß 6, my trans.). In this 
context, ideal means that “time in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing” (ibid.) 
10 Interestingly, there is some evidence that Gödel regarded causation as a truly, objectively 
existing relation, giving rise to our experience of succession and change: “The real idea behind 
time is causation: the time structure of the world is just its causal structure.” (Wang 1995, 229). 
11 The passage quoted by Gödel is in the 1787 edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 54. 
12 See Mellor (1981) and Faye (1989), who defend a tenseless ontology and are therefore 
tenseless theorists. 
13 In Kant’s parlance, as Gödel reports it in his unpublished manuscript C1, the three theses 
presented above correspond to the claims that “time is neither something “existing in itself”, nor 
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“a characteristic or ordering inhering in the objects”, but only a characteristic inherent in the 
relation of the objects to something else”(1990, 247). 
14 Rynasiewicz (1996) offers some good reasons in favor of my ignoring this side of the issue: to 
the extent that the general theory of relativity fails to distinguish between empty space and 
matter, the latter theory cannot be invoked to settle the dispute between relationists and 
substantivalist, which was meaningful only in the 17th century. 
15 Since McTaggart (1908), the series of events going from past, to present to future is known as 
the A series, while the B series is the series of events ordered by ‘earlier and later than’. 
16 Grünbaum (1973), for instance, does not regard the distinction between earlier and later than 
as being mind-dependent, though he is notoriously an advocate of the mind-dependence of 
nowness. 
17 A region of spacetime R is achronal if and only if any two events belonging to R are connected 
only by spacelike curves.  
18 See also Dorato (1995, ch. 10).
19 The proper time along a geodesic connecting two point, as is well known, maximizes the 
length. 
20 The temporal orientation is needed to coherently distinguish the two directions of time. 
21 The Copernican revolution, and the belief that other galaxies are not part of our own Milky 
Way are two famous examples.  
22 Note that also Clifton and Hogarth (1995), despite their suggestion of a worldline-dependent 
becoming, need to rely on asymmetric causation. If, as they write, our having lived through 
certain events is a sufficient condition to regard them as real, an event can be judged to be earlier 
than another only if the first is remembered while the second is perceived. In other words, one 
has to have a trace of the first event while one perceives the second as being later than it. And 
the trace asymmetry presupposes the asymmetry of causation. 
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